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Abstract 
Interlocked relationships are characterised by traders’ supply of inputs and cash to producers 
on credit, to be reimbursed at sale time based on a pre-defined price which is often lower than 
the prevailing market price. The study analyses determinants of choice of interlocking in the 
gum sector in Senegal and the effect of interlocking on market participation and gum 
production. Data from 422 gum producers in Northern and Eastern regions of Senegal are 
used. About 41% of respondents are involved into interlocking with village shop-owners or 
mobile traders. Interlocking positively influences market participation and production as 
found through a Heckman selection model.  
 
1. Introduction 
Gum arabic is the main product of the Acacia senegal, a tree species which is naturally 
suitable for the semi-arid regions. The Acacia tree is important for its environmental functions 
and its gum which is used in various domestic and industrial usages (Barbier, 1992:341; Fagg, 
2004:56). Gum is traded in local markets and processed within the producing country but a 
large proportion of its produce is exported as a non-timber forest product. Sudan is the world's 
largest producer of gum arabic; it produces about 50 percent of the world’s market which is 
estimated at about 45,000 tonnes. Sudan is followed by Chad and Nigeria. Senegal’s exports 
account for less than five percent of the world market (DEFCCS, 2005:15). Despite this low 
production level, collection of gum arabic in Senegal is an important source of income next to 
pastoralism and agriculture and would lead to substantial improvements in the livelihoods of 
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gum collectors (producers) when access to markets would be secured. Such improvements 
would be further incremented through upgrading gum quality by way of cleaning, sorting and 
storing gum.  
        
To the collectors, this activity has not been fully valorised: problems in collection include 
long distances to the collection areas, wildlife and wilderness, and injuries at the time of 
tapping (removing the bark to enable gum to exudate) or harvesting gum (removing the gum 
from the tree). There are also problems in marketing, including low and continually 
diminishing prices and exploitation by traders. These problems in marketing result from high 
marketing costs associated with market access, lack of information, and monetary and non-
monetary transactions where gum arabic is supplied in exchange of money or commodities 
for daily consumption. Such transactions involve interlocked contracts/relations. Through 
these relations, the collector is offered ‘on credit’ household necessities, tools or cash that he 
repays as gum sales. The interlocking system often operates through strong friendship and 
parenthood ties and on the power that the trader can use to pressurize the collector to 
reimburse. On the other hand, interlocking is supported by the lack of an effective credit 
system in the rural areas where the collectors have to rely on traders who are the main holders 
of finance. However, the main disadvantage of interlocking is that the collector is exploited 
on the way, by being offered a lower price than the prevailing market price discussed at the 
time of contracting and he cannot freely make the decision regarding to whom he chooses to 
sell his product. 
  
Our objective in this study is to analyse factors involved in the producer’s choice for 
interlocked contract and to study the impact of the latter on his decision towards gum 
collection and direct market participation. The main hypothesis is that despite the negative 
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effect of interlocking on the price received by producers, interlocking has a positive effect on 
both production and market participation since producers have to repay their debts in a market 
where they are assured of having a buyer, this is the lender who has to recover the credit he 
offered. 
 
We use data collected in Northern and Eastern regions of Senegal in 2009. The dataset 
includes responses from 422 gum collectors. Data includes information on personal 
characteristics of gum collectors and their households, details on gum collection and 
marketing and on the collector’s trading partner and market where the collector sells his gum. 
 
A probit model is used to analyse the choice of the producer to enter into interlocked relations 
based on the relative importance of transactions (related to gum arabic or other products), the 
need for credit and the relationships with the main trader. The gum production/collection and 
market participation decisions are analysed through a Heckman selection model. Besides the 
probability of interlocking, these two decisions are respectively based on (1) the gum 
production and producers characteristics and (2) distance to market and the transaction setting 
of market participation.  
 
There is vast literature on credit market failures in developing countries related to formal and 
informal rural credit, contracts in general and interlocked product and credit markets in 
particular. This literature has mainly focused on aspects including the importance of the credit 
system in rural areas (e.g. Chakrabarty and Chaudhuri, 2001:6; Manig, 1990:214); issues 
related to access to credit (e.g. Atieno, 2001:14; Ortmann and King, 2007:6 ; Yaron, 1992:2); 
impact that credit or contractual relations have on production or market participation (Singh, 
2002); and nature and impact of interlocking transactions (see Chakrabarty and Chaudhuri 
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(2001:213) for impact on interest rate or Sahu et al. (2004:220) for impact on price received 
by producers). To our knowledge, literature on interlocked contracts (including the studies 
mentioned above) merely describes these contracts without explaining how they arise in the 
first place and how they affect production and the choice of participating in market. 
Furthermore, understanding the interlocked relations in the context of the gum markets is very 
relevant to explain the behaviour of collectors in relation to the traders. This insight is highly 
important for understanding the constraints to production and marketing. It also sheds light on 
the organisation of the gum sector which is a step in improving the sector and ultimately the 
collectors’ livelihoods. Gum arabic, being a non-timber forest, becomes a practical case from 
which generalisations to other nontimber forest products could be further made. 
 
2. Market and credit access and interlocked contracts 
In a context of failures in markets in rural areas, interlocking contracts are important 
arrangements for farmers to access inputs, in particular credit, and output markets. Access to 
credit has a positive impact on smallholder production by enabling producers to benefit from 
the use of productivity potentials (Spio, 2002 quoted by Randela et al., 2008:462). Credit also 
intervenes in the output market: access to credit has a positive relationship with the level of 
market participation (Heltberg and Tarp, 2001:5; Randela et al., 2008:462). In the developing 
world there are several difficulties and high costs of gaining access to credit (Rodale Institute 
et al., 2002:19). Randela et al. (2008:456) deplored the lack of credit for small-scale cotton 
farmers in South Africa; credit deficiency negatively impacted the farmers’ ability to 
participate in markets through inflating transaction costs in input markets in Mozambique 
(Heltberg and Tarp, 2001:5); and credit also prevented farmers to acquire and utilize modern 
technology in Pakistan (Manig, 1990: 213). 
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While formal institutions could play a role in facilitating access to credit, the rural area is not 
often well served by formal credit. According to Yaron (1992:2) formal lending institutions 
generally focus on large-scale farmers and ignore small-scale farmers because of the 
significant cost of processing and servicing small loans and the prevalent belief that small 
entrepreneurs represent a greater risk than large ones. This fear for non repayment among the 
rural population increases by the fact that potential clients live scattered and have limited 
collateral specially in areas with collective types of land tenure (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2005).  
 
Apart from microfinance initiatives, the alternative solution for smallscale farmers is to apply 
for credit through informal institutions such as close relationships of friends and family or 
through lending groups or moneylenders; the risk is however that the latter exploit farmers. 
Chakrabarty and Chaudhuri (2001:9) found that even if credit allocation in the rural sector is 
at a subsidized rate, the benefit of the subsidy is extracted by moneylenders. Cooperatives, 
whether formed exclusively for credit, agricultural or marketing purposes, also intervene in 
facilitating access to credit. If they function ‘well’, they provide a safer arrangement for the 
rural farmers in need of credit (Gaye, 1991a:4; Ortmann and King, 2007:7; Yaron, 1992:1). In 
addition to the above institutions, especially in cases of potential commercial transactions, 
product contracts are often interlocked with credit. For instance, in the Senegalese milk 
market, Dièye et al. (2005:7) report that dairies could offer credit to livestock owners to 
acquire inputs (livestock feed) in the dry season. Cash advances are also given to livestock 
owners either as individuals or collectively. These credits are reimbursed in kind: from the 
receipts of the milk supplied to the dairy, the loan amount is deducted before paying the 
livestock owner. Another example from Senegal is one of local traders in the vegetable sector. 
Traders are embedded in the village and have particular knowledge which facilitates 
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relationships with producers; they also offer inputs (fertilizers and seeds) on credit (Wade, 
2009:144). As the producers are indebted towards such local traders, they reserve their 
produce to sell to these traders, in fear that if they default it will be impossible to access credit 
in the following season. 
 
These contracts that interlock input and product markets are based on the ability of producer 
to repay because, as found by Wade (2009:145), the trader takes a portion of the supply by 
way of reimbursement and pays the remaining amount to the producer. Much more important, 
the contracts relate to the types of relationship between the farmer and trader in general or the 
pastoralist and the dairy manager in the case of milk market. Such relationships are held up 
through trust in absence of well developed regulatory legal environments typical in many 
developing countries. According to Fafchamps (2006:3) trust generally reduces opportunities 
for cheating in trade by misrepresenting quality (the seller) or running away without making 
payment (the buyer). However, the trust prerequisite remains greatly important in the 
interlocked contracts. This is because there is no material collateral and even if there might be 
family or friendship ties, the ‘borrower’ should be a potential supplier of his produce which is 
used for repayment (Dièye, 2006:89; Gaye, 1991b:6). 
 
Trust is further fostered by the ability to identify a particular trading partner who very often 
does not change because the screening and search costs for a new partner may be too high or 
the change may not result in a higher expected price than that of the regular partner (Eaton et 
al., 2007). Regularity with the trading partner extending over a longer period of time is also 
important: it leads to a certain level of comprehension and routines which can reduce 
transaction costs, e.g. in price negotiation and monitoring of informal agreements. Routines 
are supported by reputation which becomes an enforcement mechanism. Especially in cases 
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where one of the transacting parties has the potential to engage in opportunistic behaviour, 
reputation is strongly considered (Pint and Baldwin, 1997:3). Furthermore, in the context of 
contracts in general and interlocked contracts in particular, reputation with respect to non-
commercial transactions is important. This refers to intervening in emergency cases or to 
offering intermediation between producers and input providers in case the trader himself does 
not supply inputs (Dièye et al., 2005:16).  
 
As summarized by Dièye (2006:131) the importance of the interlocking contracts consists of 
regularity of transactions, market assurance (since the producers knows that his produce will 
be bought), and building a network of suppliers. In the case of the dairy examples, 
interlocking even facilitates quality control (Dièye et al., 2005:9).  
 
The negative effects of interlocking of transactions mostly affect the producer. Producers 
remain price takers. Sahu et al. (2004:210) mentioned distress sales and associated loss of 
income by small farmers in Orissa (India) due to interlocked contracts. In general, while the 
producer could have a good price at the market, by interlocking, his bargaining power is 
greatly reduced as he has an obligation to sell to the trader in order to have credit in the future 
(Wade, 2009:186); the price that this producer gets, is indeed fixed at the time of choosing to 
enter into interlocked contracts (Sahu et. al, 2004:211). 
 
It is important to note that interlocking runs both ways: it is not only the ‘borrower’ that has to 
produce in order to repay but also the ‘lender’ has to recover the expenses done through 
advances, hence he also has to buy from the producers which implies a market insurance for 
the producer (Dièye, 2006:132; Galtier 2003 quoted by Wade, 2009). Accordingly, depending 
on the opportunistic behaviour of the partners, there is risk of defaulting (Wade, 2009:155). 
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To reduce this risk, Gaye (1991b:6) suggests that a trader should be a permanent resident of 
the locality where he is offering credit so that he can (socially) ‘coerce’ the producer to repay. 
If not, he should at least regularly trade with this community, otherwise the probability of 
recovering the debt in the next period is low.  
 
3. Methodology 
Our analysis of the gum collectors’ behaviour towards the choice of interlocking and the 
effect of interlocking on gum production and market participation uses a quantitative 
approach. Formal and informal interviews were conducted from February to June 2009 
through a combination of snowball and quota sampling in the Northern and Eastern regions of 
Senegal. In the Northern region, also known as the Sylvopastoral Zone, interviews were held 
with 183 producers. In the Eastern region, similar interviews were held with 239 producers. 
Gum arabic has been extensively collected in the Northern zone for over five centuries 
(Webb, 1985:4) while in Eastern Senegal, the collection activity has intensively started in the 
last five years through the intervention of EXPERNA, a collectors’ association. This is the 
only active association in the gum sector in Senegal; other associations remain at an 
embryonic stage. Private companies are involved in the Senegalese gum sector in production 
(Asylia Gum), processing (Valdafrique) or just exporting (MCI).  
 
3.1 Gum production function  
Collectors of gum arabic belong to households engaged mainly in pastoral and agricultural 
activities. They undertake collection as a secondary activity in the dry season when no other 
agricultural activities are intensively going on. Acacia senegal trees are found in the semi-dry 
areas, mainly in natural forests or in artificial plantations realized by reforestation projects. 
Gum is exploited either communally or in private plots. Generally no tree management is 
done and inputs are limited to labour  
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The gum collection behaviour can be analysed through the following production function: 
Qcoll = q (P, Tree, Pe, T; Ir)    (1) 
  
The determinants of quantity collected (Qcoll) are: 
(1) Production characteristics (P): these include (a) experience as one of the producer’s 
characteristics which has a positive effect on the amount harvested and even on the quality of 
gum collected and (b) number of collectors in the household which would increase the total 
quantity of gum collected from the exudates from the bark of Acacia senegal trees. Exudation 
is either natural from the breaking of the bark by the heat or wind or by deliberate tapping. 
After 7 to 15 days when the gum has sufficiently matured, it is harvested from the tree. The 
number of collectors can also have relevance for labour division in the family: the older/more 
experienced producers can do the tapping while the younger collectors can harvest the gum 
from the tree. 
 
(2) The presence of trees (Tree): Acacia senegal trees are mainly found on communal forests 
and to a lesser extent on private plots. In the natural stands, it is quasi impossible to know the 
density of the trees in the plot let alone the actual number of trees on which gum was 
harvested. Hence two proxies are used namely (a) a dummy variable that gum was harvested 
on a communal plot: collection of gum on a communal plot would entail competition among 
producers and it has a high risk of theft; it has a negative effect on the produce in terms of 
quantity or quality (as the gum is not left to mature sufficiently); (b) the days spent on tapping 
give an indication of the size of the plot. 
 
(3) Expected price (E): the current gum price is most often determined by the trader depending 
on his estimation of marketing and transaction costs but also on the quantity that is expected 
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to be supplied in relation to demand. There are variations in price associated with variations in 
quantity throughout seasons. Irrespective of these variations across the years, the highest price 
obtained in the previous season should give an indication of what can be expected by the 
producers. 
 
(4) Travel time (T): as mentioned, collection occurs in the forest. Depending on its location, 
producers spend half, whole or even several days in the forest. However the location itself 
may not matter in case the producer has some means of transport. Hence, time as such cannot 
be totally imputed to the collection but we use its two proxies namely the distance to the 
collection plot/forest (in kms) and the ownership of cart which is used for transport (number 
of carts). While long distances discourage collection, the ownership of a cart, showing the 
facility to travel to the collection place, has a positive effect on collection. 
 
(5) Interlocked contracts: we assume that being involved in interlocked contracts increases 
production because of a better access to credit and a secured market.  
 
3.2 Gum market participation 
 
The actual participation of entering the gum market depends on a comparison of the market 
price and the cost involved in harvesting, post-harvest and sales. These costs include the 
direct cost of travelling to the market and transaction costs that depend on the transaction 
setting as expressed in the market participation function below: 
Participation = f (D, Ts; Ir)                    (2) 
 
The influencing factors of the decision to participate in market (participation) are: 
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(1) Distance to market (D): this is the physical distance estimated in kilometres from the 
collector’s home to the market. The collector normally takes the gum to his home for cleaning 
or drying before bringing it to the market, hence it is more realistic to consider this distance 
than the distance from the field to the market. We prefer the distance measured in km over the 
monetary transport costs as this greatly depends on the means of transport available. 
Moreover, long distance between the collector's home and the market indicates high 
transaction costs in access to information on prices, market supplies, possible buyers and so 
on.  
 
(2) The transaction setting (Ts) has an impact on participation. It includes several 
components:  
(a) number of buyers whose effect on participation is controversial: many potential buyers 
(i.e. traders) may on the one hand interact in a competition that raises the market price thereby 
increasing the probability of participation. Yet, the buyers may also collide to lower the price 
especially if there is no strict demand for gum at higher levels of the marketing chain; 
(b) access to information: given high costs of searching, screening and negotiation (detailed in 
Bellemare and Barrett, 2006:10) and the controversial presence of buyers as described above, 
better information plays an important role for sellers (producers) since they could better 
decide to participate in the market knowing the prevailing market price and requirements in 
terms of quality and other conditions; 
(c) frequency of sale arguably has a positive effect on participation by reducing the cost of 
transacting through the relationships established with the trader as proposed in literature 
(details found for instance in Williamson, 1991 and Ménard, 2004; 2005); and, 
(d) selling through an association or producers’ group has scale advantages of market 
assurance (the association or group might have already secured a sale contract with a 
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company or exporter) and better price (through higher bargaining power). Producer groups 
also attract buyers more easily.  
 
(3) Interlocked contracts obviously improve market participation as they provide for a secured 
buyer of the product.  
  
3.3. Determinants of participation in interlocked contracts 
 
As hypothesised in this study, interlocked relations influence production (equation 1) and 
market participation (equation 2). This is because the producer who has already contracted 
credit, must repay. For livestock owners gum constitutes an easy way of raising money rather 
than selling animals as their constitute a major form of security.  
 
The probability of choosing interlocked relations is studied through a probit model. We 
assume that the probability of entering an interlocked contract is based on the relative 
importance of transactions (related to gum arabic or other products), the need for credit and 
the relationships with the main trader.  
(1) The relative importance of transactions are producers’ perceptions with regard to the 
regularity of sales of gum arabic or other products, the significance of payment date and the 
potential buyers in the market in price determination.  
(a) importance of the regularity of sales, mainly of gum arabic or other products indicate the 
opportunities for interlocking. These opportunities reflect the ease to take or offer a debt; 
hence their high importance leads to higher probability of choosing for interlocking contracts. 
(b) importance of payment date. For a producer who has sold his gum, having to wait for a 
long period before receiving his payment, increases the urge to spend the money he does not 
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yet have and so is the risk of exceeding the amount due to him. This excess has to be repaid 
by his future sale, thereby increasing the probability to get into interlocked relations. 
(c) importance of potential buyers  
Producers were asked to give their perceptions on these items with scores of -1, 0 and 1 for 
highly important, neutral and low important scores, respectively.  
 
(2) Credit need is measured by the producers’ confirmation to have taken credit in the past 
(with a score of 1 or otherwise not with a score of 0) and access to remittances as a proportion 
to his wealth (value of livestock). 
 
(3) The relationships with the trader also has an impact on this choice: trust that the producer 
has in the trader existing parental or friendship ties, the trader’s reputation and his readiness to 
offer advances and general finances in cases of emergency. This is checked with several 
dummies for which a score one confirms the positive appreciation of the producers respective 
to trust, reputation and financing.  
 
The estimates of the probit for the choice of interlocking are further included in the 
determination of production and market participation. Similar to Makhura et al. (2001) and 
Jagwe et al. (2009), this is done through a Heckman selection model.  In a first step of the 
model, the probability of market participation is modeled (equation 2). This probability is 
entered in the second step, namely the model of quantity produced (equation 1). This second 
step only takes into account producers who have participated in the market (selected group).  
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4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Interlocked relations in the Senegalese gum sector 
Interlocked relations are not imposed but remain the choice of the producer. In the gum 
market in Senegal, the producer has the choice of keeping such relations with a main trading 
partner as a village shop owner or regular mobile trader who moves from one market to 
another, commonly known as ‘banabana’. Forty-one percent (41%) of the respondents have 
chosen to be in such interlocked relations. The other options open to the collectors include the 
spot market transactions in weekly markets, to intermediaries of wholesalers/exporters, 
companies or selling through the association (EXPERNA is currently the only active 
association in the gum sector).  
 
According to a report by the Direction des Eaux, des Forêts, de la Chasse et de la 
Conservation des Sols in Senegal (DEFCCS, 2005:20), the choice for being in interlocked 
relations is close to a general rule: almost each household producing gum is affiliated to a 
regular trader who is often a village shop owner or an experienced mobile. This affiliation 
results from traditional collaborations and is based on ethnic affiliations, appreciation for 
support in difficult times and friendship. In this context, traders finance gum arabic harvesting 
activities and other economic operations by providing capital, tools and other basic 
commodities (water, sugar, tea, rice, etc.) for the households to get by during the lean season 
(Njomaha, 2008:31). Gum collectors generally pay back in kind at prices integrating 
important credit charges (Fagg, 2004:61): all the harvested gum of the household is sold to 
that trader if prices on the market are more or less uniform. In case market prices are 
competitive, producers sell a good part of their produce to the trader offering the highest 
price. However such transactions should be unknown to the regular trading partner who gets a 
small part of the produce in order to maintain trust and good relations (DEFCCS, 2005:20). 
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These transactions continue to occur due to the absence of functional market and credit 
system in the rural Senegal (Lesourd, 2001:4, Rodale Institute et al., 2002:19). The probability 
of interlocking choice in the gum sector is analysed through a probit model. Its results are 
presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Probit results of the choice for interlocked relationshipsa (1: interlocking; 0: no-
interlocking) 
Variable Estimates Standard  
Error
Marginal 
effect 
Regularity of gum transactions (1: high importance) -0.031 -0.132 -0.012 
Regularity of other products transactions (1: high 
importance) 
-0.153 -0.094* -0.061 
Importance of payment date (1: high importance) 0.431 0.129*** 0.172 
Importance of potential buyers (1: high importance) -0.453 -0.133*** -0.181 
Credit need(1:yes)  0.818 0.151*** 0.316 
Remittances * wealth 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Trust to trader (1: high importance) 0.094 0. 158 0.037 
Relationship to trader (1: high importance) 0.716 0.204*** 0.271 
Reputation of trader (1: high importance) 0.116 0.170 0.046 
Finance ability of trader (1: high importance) 0.294 0.195+ 0.116 
Constant -0.463 -0.212**  
Number of observation  =    421 (N0 = 248 and N1 = 173)                                         
LR chi2(10)     =      102.50                                                   
Prob > chi2     =     0.000 
Log likelihood = -240.564                        
Pseudo R2       =     0.176 
Probability of interlocking = 0.502 
a *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.       
 
The model predicts well the probability of interlocking as 0.502. The factors that positively 
influence the probability to choose interlocked relations include: (a) the high importance 
given to the time of payment because of the need for money; (b) credit need, because it 
becomes natural to go to the trader to request an advance; (c) relationship with the trader 
through family or friendship because he is part of the community and can anticipate the need 
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of the producer. Furthermore he can even give to the producer an ‘extra hand’ meaning higher 
amount than to the person he is related to; and (d) if the producer knows that the trader has the 
ability to advance him, then he will go to make the request. Even if this ability is not 
deterministic that his request will be accepted, it is an important factor as the producer knows 
that a request might be accepted. This can be the case as indeed many contacts may be 
unfruitful (in Gaye, 1991a:6). 
 
The factors that negatively influence the probability to choose interlocked relations include: 
(a) the regularity of transactions on other products which implies that the producer may not 
need the advance that he will have to repay in gum arabic terms. There are two explanations: 
either the producer is self-sufficient or he can reimburse through other products he brings to 
the trader. These products include other forest products, agricultural products or even 
livestock; (b) the number of potential buyers was expected to have a positive effect as 
potential buyers would be trying to enlarge their supply network thereby luring producers into 
interlocked relations as suggested by Dièye (2006:132). The alternative reason however might 
be that these potential buyers will compete in the market thereby increasing the price at which 
they buy the gum; in this case the producer will hold on as much as possible to his gum so 
that he can have a better deal rather than being paid a lower/agreed price. The possibility to 
benefit from this assessment assumes that the producer has perfect information on the market 
price including the price and the number of buyers.  
 
Before moving to the influence of interlocked relationships on the production and marketing 
behaviour, we check the negative impact of interlocking contracts on the price received by the 
trader as suggested by literature. For this purpose, we check the Pearson correlation between 
the current price and the estimated of probability of interlocking, which is r = - 0.127**. The 
17 
 
coefficient is small but significant at 5 percent, which suggests that interlocking, as a way of 
repaying for credit, negatively affects producers’ bargaining power thereby leading to lower 
prices compared to the case where there would not be such relationship. There are other 
variables that could be explored in explaining the price such as the trader’s power on the 
ability to fix the price which includes his experience and the number of markets he is 
operating in; this side is not explored in the current study. The risk on the side of the traders 
involved in interlocking transactions is also not explored here.  
 
4.2 Analysing gum production and participation in gum market in Senegal  
 
The analysis consists of a Heckman model where the probability of entering in interlocked 
markets is taken as an independent variable in the participation decision and in the production 
decision. Market participation is the selection function (equation 2) while gum production is 
the function of main interest (equation1). The model shows coefficients for the explanatory 
variables, their standard errors and how significant they are in their influence on the quantity 
of gum collected or market participation (the dependent variables). Furthermore, it illustrates 
the marginal effects at sample means. 
 
(a) Participation in gum market 
 
Tables 2 and 3 respectively show the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the market 
participation function, their expected impact and the Heckman model results for the market 
participation (1 : participation ; 0 : no-participation). The explanatory variables are the 
dummy for gum production zones, estimated probability of interlocking, distance to market, 
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proxies for the transaction setting. and estimated probability of choosing interlocking 
relations. 
  
Table 2: Participation variables: summary of descriptive statistics and expected sign 
Variable Mean SD Expected sign 
Distance to market (kms) 5.992 6.683 - 
Number of potential buyers (persons) 2.369 3.736 +/- 
Information access (1: yes) 0.795 0.020 - 
Frequency of sale (1: multiple transactions with same 
trader) 
0.645 0.023 + 
Trading group/association (1=yes) 0.657 0.023 + 
Interlocked relations (estimated probability)   + 
 
Table 3: Heckman results for the market participation (1: participation; 0: no-
participation)c  
Number of observations = 408 
Censored observations  = 24 
Wald chi2(10)      =    730.07 
Variable Coefficient  Standard error Marginal effect 
Zone (1:Eastern Senegal) -0.455 -0.289+ 0.138 
Probability of interlocked contract 0.598 0.563 0.217 
Access to information (1: yes) 0.177 0.245 0 
Number of buyers  -0.033 -0.068 0 
Frequency of sale (1: multiple transactions 
with same trader) 
0.046 0.061 0 
Group (1: sold through group or association) 0.708 0.228*** 0 
Distance to market (kms) -0.028 -0.012** 0 
Constant 1.170 0.522**  
Athrho  -0.627 -0.250**  
Lnsigma -0.341 -0.042***  
Rho (ρ) -0.556 -0.173  
Sigma ( v ) 0.711 0.030  
Lambda -0.396 -0.132  
c *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.       
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There are differences in the probability of market participation across zone: the sylvopastoral 
zone in Senegal has higher probability since it has been the interest of many buyers who 
concentrated their procurement activities in this accessible zone with the aim of minimising 
transport costs thereby maximizing their profits (AsyilaGum, Unpublished). We find a 
significant positive effect of only the membership in trading in group or association: this is 
because the group can bargain a good price in addition to providing a market assurance. The 
distance to market, as expected, reduces the probability to participate in the market: when the 
distance becomes longer, it discourages participation in the market because this is not 
accessible. As expected the interlocked relations have a positive effect on market participation, 
however this was not found to be very significant. 
 
(b) Gum production 
Tables 4 and 5 show the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the descriptive statistics 
of the variables used in the production function, their expected impact and the Heckman 
model results for the quantity collected (estimated in log), respectively. The explanatory 
variables are the dummy for production characteristics, proxies for the presence of trees, 
expected price and estimated probability of interlocking.  
 
Table 4: Production variables: summary of descriptive statistics and expected sign 
Variable Mean SD Expected sign 
Distance to plot (kms) 7.338 9.405 - 
Number of carts 0.587 0.899 + 
Collection experience (years) 18.194 35.694 + 
Collectors in household (persons) 0.557 1.435 + 
Collection plot management (1:common property) 0.780 0.021 - 
Tapping days 7.705 21.746 + 
Expected price (log) 6.343 0.424 + 
Interlocked relations (estimated probability)   + 
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Table 5: Heckman results for the quantity collected (Log)b 
Number of observations = 408 
Censored observations  = 24 
Wald chi2(10)   =  730.07 
Variable Coefficient  Standard error Marginal effect 
Zone (1:Eastern Senegal) -1.468 -0.143*** -1.468 
Probability of locked contract 0.443 0.196** 0.443 
Number of carts 0.216 0.060***    0.216 
Collection experience (years) 0.005 0.001*** 0.004 
Distance to plot (kms) -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
Collectors in household (number of persons) -0.039 -0.038 -0.039 
Tapping days 0.013 0.004*** 0.013 
Collection plot management (1: common) 0.518 0.110*** 0.518 
Expected price (log) -0.280 -0.111** -0.280 
Constant 7.036 0.719 0.000 
Athrho  -0.627 -0.250**  
Lnsigma -0.341 -0.042***  
Rho (ρ) -0.556 -0.173  
Sigma ( v ) 0.711 0.030  
Lambda -0.396 -0.132  
b *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.       
 
There is a significant difference in the quantity collected across the zone; this is much lower 
in the Eastern Senegal where gum has not been traditionally encouraged. As hypothesized, 
interlocked relations have a significant positive effect on the quantity collected. The number 
of carts possessed by the household has a positive effect on gum collection. The experience in 
collecting increases the quantity, as the producer has then the skills and also knows where he 
can get much gum (more productive places). The collection features that have significant and 
positive effect on the quantity are the tapping days and communal plot management. The 
tapping days reflecting the size of plot indeed confirm that as the producer can increase his 
gum harvests by enlarging his plot; assuming that he can do so (indefinitely), meaning that 
competition over space is still low. Similarly, communal management has a positive effect; 
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however an in-depth exploration of the property rights will reveal this (through on-going 
study). The distance to the plot, although not significant has a negative effect on the quantity 
collected as expected. 
 
Unexpectedly the price has a negative effect on the quantity collected. This finding is not 
surprising however because there are differences in zones. The Sylvopastoral zone is more 
traditionally productive but unorganized; hence it has seen the gum prices continuously 
falling over the years (Asyila Gum, Unpublished). In Eastern Senegal, although production is 
still low (DEFCCS, 2005:6) producers have organised themselves in an association 
(EXPERNA) through which their bargaining power has increased which lead to higher prices. 
Furthermore, the negative effect can be attributed to the common management: in the case 
this is going to be high, harvesters will rush to 'the common plots' to collect gum and through 
this competition the individual quantity reduces. 
 
Although estimated together, the production and market participation equations remained 
independent. The LR test that their disturbances are not correlated (i.e. the null hypothesis of 
rho = 0) gives the χ2(1) = 4.21 with a p-value of 0.0396. Hence this null hypothesis is rejected 
confirming that the equations are independent.  
 
The variables common to market participation and production functions include the dummy 
for gum production zones in Senegal (Sylvopastoral zone and Eastern Senegal), and the 
estimated probability of interlocking. A test for the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients 
on the variables (zone and estimated probability of interlocking choice) that are common to 
both decisions regarding production and market participation are equal in the two equations 
was also done. The test result is χ2(2) = 10.58 with a p-value of= 0.0051. It shows, with a 
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significant difference at the 0.1 % level, that the hypothesis of common parameters for 
common variables can be rejected. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The general hypothesis for our analysis is that interlocked transactions influence producers’ 
choice of producing gum and participate in the market despite that such relations negatively 
affect the price received by producers. We started by analysing the factors leading to 
interlocking relations in a probit model. We found that the factors increasing the probability 
for choosing interlocking include a longer payment delay, the need for credit, the relationship 
with the trader through family or friendship and the financial ability of the trader. However, 
the regularity of transactions of other products and a high number of potential buyers 
negatively influence the choice for interlocking.  
 
 
The estimates from this probit, together with other relevant variables were used in a Heckman 
model reflecting the simultaneous self-selection of collectors for market participation and 
associated production. Indeed interlocking has a positive effect on both market participation 
and production since producers have to repay their debts in a market where they are assured 
of finding a buyer being the lender who has to recover the credit he offered; in order to have 
something to sell, producers have therefore to collect gum. Market participation also seems to 
be positively influenced by participation in trading in groups or associations which can 
bargain a good price in addition to providing a market assurance. However, to participate, the 
market should be accessible.  
 
Gum production increased by the possibility to reach the collection place through having (a) 
cart(s), the collectors’ experience, the size of the plot and how it is managed. The distance to 
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the plot and unexpectedly the price to be received by the producer negatively affect the 
quantity collected.  
 
The study confirms the general idea that interlocking relations are negatively related to the 
price received by the producers; their bargaining power is hence reduced. However, in 
exploring the alternative effects that these interlocking relations have on market participation 
and production we find that such relations have a positive outcome; for instance (1) they can 
provide market assurance which is in fact a prerequisite for motivating the producer to collect 
gum; and (2) they can create a safe environment for the producer that through the contacts and 
relationships he has, his emergency periods will be covered. However, it should always kept 
in mind that interlocking are a second-best solution because the credit system is not working 
properly. Hence, the role of policymaking should be that care is taken of the institutional 
environment to avoid that the producer be held indefinitely and unwillingly out of lack of 
other sources of credit into these relations. This is because he would be dependent on the 
trader, who is just an economic agent interested in profit (and hence not altruistic). This trader 
might exploit the producer and prevent him to benefit from the prevailing market prices, 
especially if these are higher than the price agreed-on at the time of entering into interlocking. 
Furthermore, the sector should be re-organised so that buyers can be encouraged to participate 
in the market. These opportunities will reduce the dependency of the producer to a single 
trader but more importantly, through competition, they will increase the price to the producer 
which would translate into an incentive for improved production and subsequently his 
livelihoods.  
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